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ABSTRACT
Judicial Independence Focused on High Courts in Latin America
Adila Fathallah

This report encompasses the meanings of judicial independence, and all the aspects
in which define and have been used to measure it historically, focusing on Latin American
countries to present a clear image of the difficulties and attempts that go into judicial
independence achievement. The rule of law depends on independence for judges and the
judiciary, in relation to being able to uphold the law of the land without outside pressures,
fear or favour to any other branch of government or other entities, and the general public.
Legal safeguards are defined and shown example in Latin American countries over the
course of many years, to clarify and illustrate how these safeguards have been enacted, how
they have failed, and how they have been altered to better enhance the judicial
independence in a country. Tenure and appointment processes, as well as salary and other
governmental powers, are focused, as these standards are some of the building blocks of
judicial independence, and the corruption in Latin American countries is define to show
how these aspects have changed over the course of history to implement decisions or better
fit an overtaking regime.
It is found that judicial independence cannot be measured nor given numerical
assignment, but that it is a spectrum, and without complete buy-in from all weights in the
judiciary, true independence cannot be achieved.
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Introduction
It has been preached since the beginning of time that a democracy is vital when man
attempts to govern himself. With democracy comes structure and rules, laws of the land that
must be followed to keep order and citizens in line. Without this order, society can
quintessentially fall apart. And when citizens disrupt the order, is when the branch of justice
comes into line.
Justice is how fairness is administered; how the law of the land is able to thrive and
survive, and ultimately be enforced. And it is judicial independence that is the force that
becomes the backbone of what justice is sculpted upon.
Latin American countries are an incredible example of the ups and downs it takes, where
the measurement of independence is vague, and the standards upheld are not always permissible.
Focusing on this area’s jurisdiction enables the wide realization that judiciary independence is
not an easy path to take, and achieving completely is essentially impossible without confidence,
transparency, and efforts from all.
Judicial independence is the idea of keeping the judiciary separate from all other parts of
government. It can be described as a spectrum, ranging from different aspects within a
government structure, its ideals, a country’s culture, and merely how citizens perceive the law of
the land. It is the engine for the separation of powers, to ensure that all decisions made by the
judiciary are without outside judgement, unbias, free from private and public interests.

Why is it important?
Its importance is one that many oversee, though it truly holds the most weight when
coming to a society. Those in the role as a mediator, often judges, as well as the judiciary as a
whole, are held to the standard of keeping impartiality and independence of all pressures from
the outside, as well as each other, to guarantee the public of the confidence that cases are decided
fairly in accordance to the law (Ferejohn 1999). These pressures can come from the other
branches, executive, legislative, as well as private lobbyists, individual litigants, media, other
judges, and more prevalently, self interest (Ferejohn 1999).
Mediators have an imperative role when coming to decisions on cases. A citizen should
be confident that only the information presented in a case, the relevant evidence provided in
accordance to the law of the land, is what is put into effect. This is ultimately the constitutional
responsibility-- to provide fair and impartial justice (Ferejohn 1999).
This, however, becomes difficult when coming to cases that involve the state versus
citizen, and where independence becomes more vital than ever. With each country comes
different government structure, and therefore the responsibility of the judiciary to keep citizens
safe of governmental wrongdoing enforces independence from political endeavors even more
(Ferejohn 1999). If influence is received by the judiciary from government, the essence of
independence is lost, and fair justice cannot be reached. Judiciary is to protect the citizen as well
as the constitution.
Protecting Independence

To understand judicial independence is to also understand that judges are human. And
though many can attempt to enforce and apply impartiality, human will always have ideals and
opinions, weights and thoughts and experiences that could potentially influence decision-making
in a sense that temptation can creep its ugly head. ‘Institutional shields’ are often tried to be put
into effect when protecting these mediators from threats and temptation. It can be described that
institutional judicial independence is a feature that cannot be seen as valuable, but more so
instrumental to the pursuit of other values of the rule of law or constitutional values (Ferejohn
1999).
It should be seen that judges are protected in making decisions without worrying about
the potential consequences from such decisions-- but providing these protections is in no sense a
guarantee that they will always act impartially in regards to the rule of law and constitutional
values, solely (Ferejohn 1999). Historically speaking, it is seen that protections enforce the
opposite; too much leeway actually allows judges to act with influence, since protection is
enforced, especially when coming to self-interest and imposing opinions on a society. An
example can be taken during the New York debates over the ratification of the US Constitution.
Brutus, one of the original of the Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution, was a
pseudonym that honored that Roman republican who was one of those who assassinated Julius
Caesar, and confronted these aspects in the New York Journal during the same period The
Federalist was appearing in New York newspapers (Constitution.org). He worried that the
Constitution created a judiciary that enforced too much independence, stating that “the real effect
of this system of government, will…be brought home to the feelings of the people, through the
medium of the judicial power.” He worried that judges with this type of power would be put in a

position that many were not thinking about clearly, also stating that “they are to be rendered
totally independent, both of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and
their salaries. No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power above them...nor can
they be removed from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudications” (Ferejohn 1999).
In consequence, these concerns of Brutus were attacked in different ways, and whether
they are actually effective comes with the spectrum of judicial independence stated beforehand.
Two ways; the appointment process is one aspect of judicial independence that sits on the
spectrum, in which usually ensures as much as possible that those appointed have appropriate
character and impartiality on the mind. It is clear to see, however, that this process is imperfect;
it cannot ensure institutionally protected judges will actually act independently when on the
bench. So, the second process, the commitment to the democratic process, in which requires
judges to be made somewhat accountable to the people they represent, can be seen through the
eyes of judicial election (Ferejohn 1999). Election is also on the judicial independence spectrum,
and self-interest is evident in this scenario.
Though we see independence in the light of having the mediator able to do a job without
the interference of the outside force, it is imperative to realize that there is a hindsight that many
do not realize as well. Is this type of ideology enforced? We think as such; the judiciary is to
enforce the rule and law of the land. Does the judiciary rely on some other institution, like
Congress, the president, for jurisdiction, rules, and execution of judicial orders? This dips into
judicial dependence, though it depends on the form it takes and the hypothetical at hand
(Ferejohn 1999).

The prior is dealt with as such; the executive fails to execute a judicial decision, or
Congress prevents a judge from hearing a specific case in efforts to reach a certain decision,
dependence is then evident. Other branches may attempt to interfere with the judiciary by
packing courts with certain particular judges, enforcing specific jurisdictions, or passing laws
that may overturn a judicial decision-- these are all illegitimate forms of jurisdictional regulation
(Ferejohn 1999). There is a line, and though many governments may not be able to see this, it is
imperative that appropriate forms of institutional dependence from objectionable interferences
with the execution of the judicial power are separated.
To protect judicial independence, the aspects of potential threats of coercion and/or
blandishments is essentially what has been focused on in the eyes of the individual judge. This is
where another aspect of the spectrum can be introduced-- term of office. Historically, ultimate
judicial independence is characterized by a term of life tenure during good behavior, prohibiting
a reduced judicial salary during the term of office. Throughout history, this has shown to be
reasonably effective, especially in the United States, in allowing judges to uphold impartiality
when it comes to decisions.
The question of where this should be evidently stated, and ultimately enforced,
consequently becomes a problem as well. If this wording is in the Constitution of a country, how
would it essentially be effective and enforced? Could a court simply overturn any congressional
attempt to violate lifetime tenure or lower judicial salaries? What would be done in relation to
infringements? Where is the check and balance to this type of power?
Judicial Review, A Constant

This is where the constant of judicial review is introduced. Judicial review is described as
the “power of an independent judiciary to determine whether acts of other components of the
government are in accordance with the constitution; any action that conflicts with the
constitution is declared unconstitutional and therefore nullified” (Primohistory.com). Even
backed up with judicial review, cannot explain the constitutional protections for judges that have
remained relatively strong (Ferejohn 1999).
However, it is constitutional endeavors that are essentially what links judicial review to
judicial independence in the structural protections. Ferejohn eloquently explains that “political
intrusions on judicial terrain depend on the capacity of politicians to achieve sufficiently high
levels of coordination to overcome the checks and balances imposed by a Constitution.” To
explain furthermore, impeachments in the United States, for example, must be brought into
Congress and subject to a specific majority in voting rule, and majorities of the size are difficult
to put together and sustain over a period of time, especially if the impeachment is based on
controversial politics in a decision by a specific judge that is brought about for impeachment
(Ferejohn 1999).
To bring out the quintessence of an ideal judicial independence hypothetical, the basic
constitutional protection for judges is upheld consistently for the mere desire that other branches
and citizens themselves do not want to alter these rules. This is confusing however, in the sense
that judges make multiple unpopular decisions, where those who are in positions of power to
essentially want to not accept these decisions can raise hell about them and attempt to ruin the
system for individual judges. This was also one of Brutus’ concerns if the judiciary was made
too independent (Ferejohn 1999).

Protections Compared - United States
To better understand the spectrum of judicial independence, we can compare the United
States’ rule of law and judiciary with other countries’ processes.
Within the United States, judges are able to ensure some insulation from political
intrusions, and the Constitution defines the characteristics in that the institutions of the judiciary
remain independent of political endeavors. However, the dependence is definitely there as well.
The Constitution allows Congress to create federal courts other than the Supreme court. It gives
Congress the power to create and regulate specific jurisdictions, the power to decide on the
number of federal judges there should be, the judiciary’s budget and funds for specific courts,
specific rules and procedures that must be enforced by the judiciary, to enact alternative systems
of courts (under Articles I and IV), to insulate state court rules and decisions form review, and
overriding specific court decisions (Ferejohn 1999). All of this is regulated through other
branches, weakening the independence factor. In addition, it is the president that has the
authority of appointing judges with Congressional consent, setting judiciary agendas, and to, or
not to, execute any rulings at all (Ferejohn 1999).
To explain furthermore, take the example of jurisdiction. Suppose a controversial case is
brought upon the court, the power under the Constitution to alter or abolish jurisdiction, can
sway with any dissatisfaction with a judicial decision, hence the infringement on judicial
independence. This can completely undermine the finality of that specific decision. That such
infringements could happen within the reasonable constitutionality of the courts makes the threat
upon judicial independence quite evident and very much credible.
Explanations for Measurements of Judicial Independence

The true basis, to re-enforce from prior, is the desire of the structured government and the
governed to want judicial independence. Without this desire, with everyone’s hand in the pot, a
country will be forever plagued by judicial biases in almost every decision made. How much
judicial independence is desirable essentially depends on the extent to which one agrees or
disagrees with the decisions of the courts, especially in regards to constitutionality. In the most
ideal legal system, with the same rules applying to all, judicial independence would be desirable
if all of a society were committed to the ideals of equality of justice for all. In contrast, if a
society were more so committed to the upholding of class privileges based on politics and
economic endeavors, where one type of law is applied to elites and another for the general
public, for example, judicial independence would not fundamentally be a desirable aspect of the
court (Rosenn 1987).
Measuring judicial independence is incredibly difficult. This is due to the fact of the
spectrum, as well as the facade that many courts put on to create the illusion of independence,
even when it clearly is not present. No court wants to be seen as dependent or bias. Judges do not
write opinions indicating that a result would have been different had they been independent; so
instead, they attempt to rationalize decisions through law, rather than the outside pressure that
influenced. Judges can show independence in some cases, and not in others as well. Periods of
time may also influence some judges, depending on self-interest or public interest, or even
political interest, and Latin American politics have been a consistent example of how the
discrepancies of judicial independence can essentially not work, or work the facade indicated.
For example, in 1978, the Chilean Supreme Court was widely regarded as very
independent for the mere reason that it publicly disagreed with the executive branch, where it

accused the Allende regime of violating the Constitution. However, after Pinochet’s
overthrowing of the Allende, the Chilean Supreme Court was widely regarded as docile and
passive, because it failed to stand up to the military and defend individual constitutional rights,
obviously stated in the Constitution, and then sympathizing with the political agenda of the
Pinochet regime. Therefore, the public’s perception of judicial independence was hazy, showing
that political agendas can be taken sides within the judiciary (Rosenn 1987).
This is what makes the measuring of independence difficult. The line of “where” and the
“what” of the degree of a concept truly only lives within the judges themselves. And even then, it
is not until after a decision is made that the measurements can be made for a panel to fully
comprehend the independence that may or may not have taken place. It may not be until after the
fact that it is revealed that one or more judges involved in a decision were subjected to pressures
that may have swayed a judgement.
To further focus on Latin America, it can be shown how the quantifying of judicial
independence can suffer from significant methodological weaknesses. A professor by the name
of Kenneth Johnson attempted to measure political democracy to intertwine and get an idea of
independence by asking specific social scientists with expertise on Latin America with
questionnaires to rank the twenty republics. Judicial independence in the study was defined as
“the extent of respect for the court’s decisions,” “the extent to which the court has the courage of
its convictions” and “is free from executive domination.” Johnson measures whether the
“decisions are dignified and founded on law,” and the extents of people and political leaders
reliance “on judicial processes rather than arbitrary executive or legislative action or military
force” (Rosenn 1987).

The methodology he used was a ranking system in which numerical scores were given on
the Latin American judiciaries with respect to independence. To summarize, Costa Rica received
the highest scores, while Haiti received the lowest. Though results were produced, most of this
can be considered merely delusional hearsay from potential biased scientists that do not even
represent a valid indication of the judiciaries, nor potentially fully understand its practices like
practicing lawyers comprehend more.
Because this study’s focus was on 1945 to 1975, it can be said with confidence that these
results are not entirely subjected to complete truth in today’s day in age. In addition, we cannot
confidently allow a numerical measurement to truly define the spectrum that is judicial
independence-- the quantification is generally not an accurate and precise measurement because
of different constants’ presence, or non-presence in a court’s judicial or political system.
To emphasize the quantifications attempted to clarify between Latin American countries’
and United States’ Supreme Courts, Professor Carl Schwarz compared the percentages of US
habeas corpus cases in which were in favor of the non-governmental party, and the amparo
actions decided in favor of the non-governmental party in penal cases before the Mexican
Supreme Court.
In Mexican law, amparo is a complex action that can function as a writ of habeas corpus,
injunction, declaratory judgement, or appeal. A leading Mexican jurist observed that this action
combines five specific procedural functions. The first being the protection of life and liberty;
second, a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation; the third, resolution of conflicts from
administrative acts or decisions; four, the appeal of judicial decisions; and five, the protection of

peasant rights in agrarian reform all provide the basis and backbone of the amparo (Rosenn
1987).
With Schwarz’s attempt, these actions were compared over a thirty-three month period,
unfortunately showing a misleading pattern and yet another reason to add onto why an attempt at
quantifying is not the best way to go-- the jurisdictional requirements for the two kinds of cases
are entirely different. Every claim of misapplication of state law by the state courts can be
converted into a federal constitutional issue under Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution
(Rosenn 1987). Amparo  then often serves as the functional equivalent of a direct appeal from
the state courts to the federal courts. One also has to distinguish between pre-trial habeas corpus
or amparo cases, which may bring about the potential pressures between the executive and the
judiciary. Then, with post-conviction habeas corpus or amparo cases, the appellate court
generally reviews the conduct of the lower court.
There is no clarity whether a low percentage of habeas corpus or amparo cases decided
against the government indicate literally anything about the degree to which judicial
independence exists and is being used. Judicial independence becomes an important factor only
in those relatively few cases where the political authorities are deeply concerned that a particular
result must be reached, and even that result differs from the one the judges would reach if left to
their own (Rosenn 1987).
Because of its unquantifiable conceptualization, judicial independence is not something
able to be numerically calculated with percentages. If a country meticulously observes the law
and the constitution through their justice systems, habeas corpus should never even be allowed
to begin with. Though it can be agreed that a low percentage of habeas corpus against the

government may show a high correlation of compliance with the law and with constitutional
guarantees, it may also very well signify judicial ineffectiveness presented to a regime that
“makes people disappear without any legal process” and which “refuses to acknowledge any
information concerning the whereabouts of persons on whose behalf writs of habeas corpus are
filed” (Rosenn). To clarify further, with just the massive amount of cases, corruption is more
likely to create higher pressures against judicial independence than the suspected political
influence that most think of. Bribery is almost consistently a pressure present in almost any case
decision, while political influence is only truly relevant and used when a party is connected
somehow in the case, or the outcome somehow will influence and/or effect the party in future
endeavors (Rosenn 1987). Hence, the spectrum, and therefore the concept consistently stated,
being that quantitating judicial independence is practically impossible and a ranking is harder to
accomplish than most would think.
If concise statistics existed in a perfect world, where a number was able to be assigned to
the mentality and thinking process as well as circumstances of every judge in a country, then it
could be done to plot these judiciaries on a hypothetical spectrum between complete
independence and complete subordination, seeing as every country with a judiciary would plot
between these two standards. But unfortunately, this is not possible, and even if it were, the
aspect of even how active the role of the judiciary is in a country always rises first. Judicial
independence can be described as continuous rather than dichotomous, and assessing its value is
much more than merely combining specific elements into a type of index, and which variables
are weighted more than others is completely subjective on the basis of a country and its
judiciary.

A good question to ask is this; how would a country with highly politicized judicial
appointments, but minimal post-appointment interference compare with a country that selects
judges on merit but promotes them on the basis of the political ramifications of their decisions?
(Worldbank.org). Judicial independence can vary on the judge, or even the case; for example,
during the Franco era, Spain’s general civil courts were consistently independent, however when
it came to politically-sensitive cases, these were only handled by different and non-independent
tribunals (Toharia 1975).
In beginning this research, certain constants stood out to make an attempt to measure
judicial independence-- aspects such as appointment versus election, selection process, tenure,
political structure, governmental structure, judicial budget. However, even with all of these
constants, a true measurement of judicial independence can still be deemed inadequate and still
do not ensure a true independent judiciary.
Constants Further & Protections
To explain furthermore through Latin American countries, a formal guarantee of
independence can be indeed manipulated, abused, or ignored completely. In recent years, there
has been a growth of attempting to enhance judicial accountability through the oversight of
established ‘judicial councils.’ In places where separation of powers is firmly established in a
political structure, judicial councils have created massive debates between strict interpretationists
who are in favor of a more internal control mode, made up of judges, and loose interpretationists
who prefer an external control mode, where judges make up the council, but also other
representatives from other branches of government are involved from the executive and
legislature. Brazil was one that illustrated this disagreement perfectly when debating the

establishment of the National Council of Justice (NCJ) (Minegar 2011). Minegar conducts this
study where he uses interviews with key people in Brazil’s judicial system, with congressional
records and other resources, to show the separation between the loose and strict
interpretationists. The conclusion is what is expected, indicating the different views on
democratic governance with the concerns of the politicization of the judiciary, most of which
also was a massive debate on the mere definition of these aspects. This showed that many
stipulated that even with a defined, formal “guarantee,” the lines are still blurred, allowing
anyone’s own manipulation of the accountability and judicial independence that many want, but
cannot decide on (Minegar 2011).
There is also instances where there is very little control through governmental structure
and little is done to better utilize what is already set. For example, the Colombian selection
process has a specific appointment formula in which is used between four different government
institutions that then can manipulate the court. J van Zyl Smit says that the “weakness of the
party system amplifies this effect by making Senate votes on shortlists sometimes
unpredictable.” Politicians do not exercise much control when it comes to the Constitutional
Court when it comes to appointments, and because of the structure of a Supreme Court and the
Council of State, which is the highest tribunal, gives the opportunity to choose candidates based
on merit, even though political criteria can still very well be used and played as a role
consistently throughout, especially through competing jurisdictions of the Constitutional Court
and the Supreme Court (Smit 2016).
Even with these constitutional tribunals, to reiterate, formal mandates are not enforced.
Lifelong tenures have not in practice been guaranteed better security, for example, of the tenure

than long fixed terms. A permanent appointment may not be an actual permanent appointment,
and everyone involved will be aware of this. In some cases, unlawful means may be used by
political actors to secure the exit of judges that displease them or do not abide by specific
standards, while in others, the constitutional framework has simply been changed to better suit
the wants and needs of political endeavors (Smit 2016).
Therefore, it can evidently be said that even formal protections are not sufficient in
evaluating the actual significance of independence when it comes to a judiciary.
All can be either very broad or very concise, but its actual implication within a country is
one that is still very subjective based on period of time and the case at hand. All Latin American
countries provide for and state to have some type of independent judiciary. The rule of law
depends on this to adjudicate without fear or favour, giving the public a sense of confidence that
any dispute will have a fair resolution, as well as a mere legal safeguard that supports even a
perceived independence. Some do so formally, and others are merely measures designed to
insure the independence. Rosenn splits these measures in half, giving the categories two names,
with one being the “protection of the integrity of the judicial decision-making process from
outside pressures,” and the other a “protection of the personal independence of the judge”
(Rosenn).
To enhance the first, Peru’s 1980 Constitution, Article 233, states the following;
The following are guarantees of the administration of justice:
. . . 2. Independence in its exercise. No authority may assume jurisdiction in cases
pending before the judiciary or interfere in the exercise of its functions. Neither
can court cases that are res judicata  be unenforced, ongoing court proceedings be

cut off, judgements modified, nor their execution delayed. This provision does not
affect the right to a pardon.

This is one of the most common ways that insured the integrity of the judicial process,
where a constitutional prohibition clearly stating against any interference specifically from the
other branches of government, with judicial proceedings. Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile all also
contain similar language that prevents the executive or legislative, like their presidents or
congresses, from attempting to interfere in even the most basic judicial functions and/or
decisions (Rosenn).
To bring back the special tribunals, Latin America is known for different tribunals being
utilized in different types of cases, like labor disputes, military injustices, agrarian reform,
subversives, administrative law, and even electoral disputes (Rosenn). The key to understand
here is linked with jurisdictional monopoly, and if the same standards for the average judge of
judicial independence is not applied to the special tribunal as well, this hinders the independence
completely. To clarify, with the transfer of jurisdiction normally exercised by the regular courts
to specially created ad hoc tribunals, judicial independence is undermined completely, and rarely
do Latin American countries’ constitutions restrict these practices in the interest of actually
safeguarding judicial independence.
The only true exception with these countries is the Peruvian Constitution of 1980, where
it provides for the unity and exclusivity of the judiciary’s jurisdiction and denies the other
branches the power to establish any other independent jurisdiction, except for military and other
similar specific tribunals (Rosenn 1987).

What is most common in Latin American constitutions are the provisions that specify
only having the judiciary decide disputes of a litigious type, or even that only the tribunals
established by law may decide criminal or civil cases.
Yet another way that Latin American countries attempt at protecting the integrity of the
decision making process is requiring judges to write reasoned opinions explaining their thought
processes throughout their decisions, much like the United States Supreme Court exercises.
However, it is also incredibly easy to get around this requirement, as outside pressures and
briberies can be masked very efficiently, though it does make it harder for judges to rationalize a
decision based solely on corruptedness and seeing the parallelism of decisions and their
autonomy with the law of the land.
Integrity is also encompassed by transparency, and requiring public trials is also an
effective way that can potentially “curb judicial arbitrariness and corruption” (Rosenn 1987).
Anything done in secret or under the table is better able to be hidden and implemented with a
secret agenda, but with an open court, public scrutiny can be pursued. Peruvian law, for example,
requires all cases in which defendants are public officials involving press crimes and
fundamental rights be guaranteed tried in an open court (Rosenn 1987).
The integrity of a court goes hand in hand when deciding the “intensity” of the spectrum
when coming to judicial independence. Having certain standards and aspects of a judicial system
enable a court for more transparency, thus showing a society that they may have a sense of
confidence in decision making. And, with all of these factors, it is still permissible to mask any
pressures and outside influencing forces, though the difficulty of doing as such can be
intensified.

With Rosenn’s second category of measures and attempts at protecting personal
independence, seven aspects can be illustrated. Rosenn brings about “irreducibility of judicial
salaries” for providing compensation to judges; “guaranteeing the judiciary a fixed percentage of
the government’s budget” in relation to a sense of financial independence for a court; “tenure in
office” to have a sense of protectiveness and belonging to an independent judge; “the selection
and reappointment processes” in relation to how these processes may influence self or political
agendas; “transferability of judges” where in Latin America, constitutions protect judges against
involuntary transfers; “avoidance of conflicts of interest” where the practice of prohibiting any
judge from engaging in any other from of economic activity; and finally, “judicial immunity” in
which defines how independence can be threatened by further lawsuits from those claiming to be
injured extensively by a judge’s decision (Rosenn 1987). All seven of these aspects link in the
spectrum of independence, and sculpt yet another picture of how judicial independence measures
and upholds a sense of personal independence to judges and their litigants.
With the “irreducibility of judicial salaries,” the basis is set upon how several Latin
American constitutions follow the example of the United States in an attempt to protect a judge’s
independence in accordance to compensation that may not be diminished during a term of office.
Essentially, this is to protect judges’ compensation if they were to make a decision that may
upset other branches of government, the executive or legislative. This becomes a type of
safeguard under which judges hold office designed in the frameworks of a constitution (Smit
2016).
For example, in the original Mexican Constitution of 1917, Article 127, even prohibited
the raising of salaries for Supreme Court members during a term of office, in which this idea

actually originated in the draft of the Compensation Clause of the US Constitution, was designed
to promote judicial independence by “insulating judges from the blandishment of salary
increases” (Rosenn 1987). It was in 1982 that Mexico had to place this ban on salary increases
due to severe inflation, and a provision was enacted to furthermore adequately calculate
compensation to be determined annually in an “equitable manner” (Rosenn 1987).
Peru’s Constitution has the most vague language regarding salary protection, stating, “a
compensation that insures for them a life worthy of their mission in the hierarchy,” though there
is a provision that states that the judiciary will receive a minimum percentage of the country’s
budget. However, it is unfortunately found that this guaranty has never been enforced. The
judiciary received .34% of the national budget in 1980, and .78% in 1985 (Report Condemn
Peru’s Judiciary, 1985).
It is Uruguay, however, that was able to enact the most effective guaranties of judicial
salaries, even with a severe inflationary society. Since 1981, members of the Uruguayan
Supreme Court’s salaries cannot be less than those of Ministers Secretaries of State, and since
these positions are well paid, the measure has assured a secure sense of judicial compensation
(Vescovi 1985). Panama has since adopted a similar guarantee for their judicial system.
With the second’s “guaranteeing the judiciary a fixed percentage of the government’s
budget,” the technique is to assure financial independence by allocating a fixed percentage of a
country’s total budget to the judiciary. Costa Rica exemplifies this, granting their judiciary no
less than six percent of the nation’s ordinary annual receipts; Honduras grants their judiciary at
least three percent, excluding loans and grants; and Peru grants two percent of the current budget
of the Central Government. Panama and Guatemala take a combined approach, where their

constitutions mandate that the judiciary’s budget will be at least two percent of the nation’s
ordinary annual receipts (Rosenn 1987).
A lack of this constitutional guaranty, like with Argentine and Bolivian judiciary, has
taken a major toll on these countries’ sense of judicial independence. Their constitutions are too
vague, merely stating that the judiciary will be provided an allocation of the nation’s budget that
is sufficient, but unspecified an exact fixed amount, and therefore has left the judiciaries in
recent years with insufficient funds for resources, and at the mercy of the executive and
legislative branches (Rosenn 1987). The complaints of this inadequacy of funds is very
widespread in Latin America, which can therefore be related to a certain plot on the spectrum of
judicial independence.
Introduction of Tenure & Appointment/Selection Processes
With the third of “tenure in office,” Rosenn expresses how judicial independence is
majorly reliant on a specific guarantee of tenure in office. Another comparison with the US
Constitution, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile follow the assurance of federal judges’ lifetime tenure,
pending good behavior (Smit 2016). Other Latin American countries do the same, with a
specified retirement age, though this is only if the judicial retirement system is satisfactory, and
unfortunately severe inflation has intertwined with certain retirement programs, thus
undermining these guarantees of judicial independence. Commonly exercised in Latin American
countries is a set term, usually between four to ten years (Rosenn 1987) Judges in other Latin
American courts also indicate a sense of insecurity in regards to tenure, one of the leading
concerns. The practice of appointing a large proportion of temporary or even provisional judges
is particularly troubling as it undermines tenure protections and thus, judicial independence is

weakened and can be ultimately unattainable (Smit 2016). This should, in essence, present an
chance to re-examine and strengthen safeguards that provide crucial support for judicial
independence in practice.
The UN’s Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985) sets standards as
well when it comes to tenure. It has been defined as an international norm for judges to have
guaranteed tenure for their term in office. And though this does contemplate fixed as well as
permanent terms, international opinion has become increasingly critical of the lack of job
stability and conflicts of interest to which fixed-term appointments give rise, even more so if a
term is renewable (Smit 2016). This enables self-interest, political pressures, and other outside
forces to have a hand in such.
It is imperative to realize the importance of tenure in regards to a legal standard of a
safeguard, since it can be instrumental when it comes to judicial independence. The key is to
make the environment of an independent judge as easy and sufficient as possible. If there is this
sense of security to a judge, then the fear of potentially being removed from office based on an
unliked decision can therefore be lessened, and decisions will be free of governmental or public
influence. Then, the domino effect; if these securities exist, then the general public will also have
the confidence that judges will make decisions in a manner that is acceptable to all, without any
outside pressures, to uphold fairness and justice.
But to step back and look at the bigger picture of this ideal, even with this protection,
there is still no true and definite guarantee that judges will behave in the most independent way.
Corruption is still inevitable, along with potential aspects of the competency of a judge and the
self-proclaimed interests and ideologies that may right above the law of the land when deciding

certain decisions on certain cases. All in all, this brings in the aspects of land, society,
economics, culture, and environment of a country. Tradition also holds a weight, and these all
can influence judges, no matter of fixed term or life-long tenure.
Latin American countries are known throughout history to have judicial removals and
consistent threats of removing judges when things do not go as planned. This is usually entrusted
to other members of the judiciary, often in the form of an appellate court or a council of
magistrates. Chile, for example, utilizes a “review system” of sorts that goes through all judges
below the level of the Supreme Court, and grades performance annually. Any of those deemed
unacceptable are dismissed, regardless of tenure (Rosenn 1987). This, as seen evidently, can be
seen as incredibly problematic, due to who is on the committee for this review system, the
standards of review, as well as if annually is an appropriate measure of substance and influence.
Argentina and Mexico follow the US model of impeachment, where it goes through the
legislature, and Brazil, Haiti, and Paraguay go through the Senate for members of the Supreme
Court for impeachment, and lower court judges are tried before the Supreme Court (Rosenn
1987). With formal language, the executive branch is not responsible for any impeachment with
the judiciary, however that actually being the case in Latin American countries, the hidden
agenda from the executive is definitely there.
Going hand in hand with tenure and terms is selection and appointment of judges. United
Nations’ Basic Principles states that “any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against
judicial appointments for improper motives,” though easier said than done, and that is evidently
shown. This principle also states that “individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate
training or qualifications in law” be selected without discrimination (Smit 2016).

This dips back into the legal safeguards, in which the terms of the selection process and
appointment of judges influences the sense of judicial independence in regards to public
transparency and omitting the sense of outside pressures, intertwining with other branches of
government in the processes. Considerations of the executive and legislative, as well as potential
judicial appointment councils, all have a weight with the selection and confirmation of
candidates for judicial office with methods to ensure objectivity.

Introductions of World Views on Latin America
In the eyes of the UN and Latin America, in 2013, a report on judicial independence
noted that appointments had become “highly politicized” where appointment power is in the
hands of the legislature or the executive, and where standards are vague and broad, creating the
worst types of corruption. This was stated in the report:
The appointment of magistrates of the highest courts, and in some countries even
judges of lower courts, is by decision of the legislative or executive branch based
on selection criteria which, although established by the Constitution and
legislation, are very broad, general and subjective, thus making it difficult to
adequately assess the personal integrity, independence and professional
qualifications of the candidates. Consequently, although the norms of all these
countries are in conformity with principle 10 of the Basic Principles, practice
reveals an absence of proper and more specific selection criteria as well as a lack
of transparency and public scrutiny in the procedures for the appointment or
election of magistrates and judges, a circumstance which has opened the door to

interference by political parties and economic groups, generating a system based
on political favours and patronage (Knaul 2013).
The Inter-American Commission on Human rights backed these statements, where an
assessment was made on independence of justice through the Americas as a whole, published
also in 2013. The Commission states the same, saying “more specific criteria (are) required to
combat the politicisation of appointments, and warns against the risk that ambiguous criteria
such as “morality” may be used to exclude disfavoured individuals or groups (IACHR 2013).
The Commision also indicates that there is a need for appropriate selection criteria, as well as
training in non-discrimination to address the underrepresentation of women and minority groups
in most jurisdictions in Latin America. Criteria should be on the basis of “personal merit and
professional qualifications, taking into account the singular and specific nature of the duties to be
performed, in such a way as to ensure equal opportunity, and with no unreasonable advantages or
privileges” (IACHR 2013).
Selection is imperative when attempting to establish an independent judiciary. If up to the
executive with no constraints, then the dangers of unqualified candidates or bias selection based
upon personal or political agendas becomes a main risk and therefore, hinders judicial
independence. And, Latin American countries have minimal qualifications for Supreme Court
candidates. In Panama’s Constitution, for example, qualifications merely include being a
native-born Panamanian, at least 35 years old, in full enjoyment of political and civil rights,
possess a duly registered law degree, and have at least ten years experience in the legal field, e.g.
practicing lawyer, judge, or law professor (Rosenn 1987). Many other Latin American countries
created actual career judiciaries with entry based on competitive examinations and comparison of

credentials, evaluated by the judiciary itself, like Colombia, El Salvador, and Brazil. Brazil’s
career judiciary reserves a certain percentage of lateral appointments on appellate courts for
practicing lawyers or state attorneys in order to provide varied legal perspectives on its top courts
(Rosenn 1987).
These judicial councils are beyond important, however, in regards to judicial
independent. This usually cuts out the executive and legislative, since their involvement can be
detrimental to the transparency and effectiveness of a judiciary. With these new constitutional
democracies and transitional societies, as the UN Special Rapporteur indicates in the above
mentioned 2013 report, countries’ appointment and selection processes should not be up to the
executive or legislative; instead, they are urged to establish these councils as independent bodies
to “undertake the selection of judges, in order for the public to gain confidence in a court system
administering justice in an independent and impartial manner, free from political considerations”
(Special Rapporteur Report 2009) (IACHR 2013). Because there is also no international law that
specifies for any of this, it becomes an even more highly desirable aspect when coming to
judicial independence.
To give more insight, the Venice Commission, in which dealt extensively with judicial
appointments in new democracies in Eastern Europe, also made some noteworthy statements in
the Report by the UN that gives another face to this type of attempt at independence, deemed to
be highly interesting and a great point to include. The Venice Commission makes a distinction
between “ordinary judges” and specialist constitutional courts, in which since constitutional
courts are indeed more political in “nature and function,” should thus justify a type of role for
legislature to have when it comes to the selection/appointment process of the judiciary (IACHR

2013) (Smit 2016). However, it is easy to see that this could and potentially will bring in
corruption, and safeguards have been enacted, especially in Latin American countries who have
indeed given other branches power. The degree to which corruption and pressures have had a
hand, and whether they have been transparent, is a subject that is bound to be brought about.
With these specialized councils, there is also the question of who. The Venice
Commission recommends that those on councils not all be judges in an effort to avoid a type of
“coporatism,” where even existing judges may make an effort to make selections based on their
own interests or further agenda, or even present a certain specific idea of what a judge should or
should not encompass. The argument with this is essentially that judicial councils should be
separate and independent from Supreme Courts and not chaired by the Chief Justice of their own
jurisdiction (IACHR 2013) (Smith 2016).
When many of the Latin American Constitutions were written in the early 1980s, a
general selection process based on four different types was the mainstage of appointment. Either
countries utilized a free executive selection with a form of legislative or judicial approval as a
check and balance, a mere free executive selection, executive selection from a list of prescreened
candidates prepared by the judiciary or the legislature, or mere legislative selection (Rosenn
1987). Argentina actually still uses the presidential selection system modeled off of the US
Constitution, where the president appoints all federal judges with Senate consent.
A popular vote, surprisingly, was not something utilized in the past as much, being that it
can compromise judicial independence by forcing judges to campaign and engage in a sense of
political activity.

In essence, a selection process should emphasize the following, stated in the Latimer
House Principles, that “judicial appointments should be made on the basis of clearly defined
criteria and by a publicly declared process. The process should ensure equality of opportunity for
all who are eligible for judicial office [and] appointment on merit.” In Latin American countries
today, these principles are tried in utilization, where the Campeche Declaration of the General
Assembly of the Latin American Federation of Judges in 2008 establishes that the “selection and
promotion of judges should be ruled by the public and transparent proceedings, based on the
weighting criteria of training, background and professional eligibility” (Smit 2016).
In regards to candidate assessment, the idea that a “selection process should include
written, anonymous examinations, with complete interviews and psychometric tests, in order to
ascertain whether the candidate is able to discharge his or her functions independently and
impartially” is supported by the UN Special Rapporteur’s report. Reforms to the assessment of
candidates “could help prevent appointments for improper reasons,” which would essentially
preclude to corruption. The Inter-American Commission stated similarly where positions should
be open to all qualified candidates, saying:
“Competitive, merit-based competitions can be a suitable means to appoint justice
operators on the basis of merit and professional qualifications. Such competitions
can consider such aspects as professional instruction and years of experience
required for the post, the results of examinations when the anonymity of the
examinations is maintained thereby ensuring that justice operators are not selected
on the basis of discretionary appointments and that persons who are interested in
applying and who meet the requirements are able to do so” (IACHR 2013).

With transparency in regards to appointment and selection of the judiciary, presented in
Trujillo v. Venezuela, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that is is crucial that open
and equal opportunity be given to candidates through widely publicized announcements to the
entire jurisdiction that show the transparency for the post in question. Publication in advance
should be announced as well as qualifications needed, procedural system, deadlines, etc, for
equal opportunity for anyone who may meet the appropriate requirements (Smit 2016).
It is also imperative that the selection process be open to public scrutiny, therefore a
candidate’s merits and qualifications are able to be seen by the general public and judged
accordingly in regards to the standards of the law. This brings an element to judicial
independence that allows for the reduction of the degree of discretion from even those who are in
the position of selection and appointment. The Inter-American Commission advocates and states
this eloquently, with that “public hearings or interviews should be held, with adequate advance
preparations, where the public, nongovernmental organizations and other interested parties will
have an opportunity to see what the selection criteria are, to challenge candidates and express
either their concern or support… [this is] essential when appointing the highest-ranking justice
operators, when procedure and selection is in the hands of the executive or legislative branch”
(IACHR 2013) (Smit 2016).
Appointments/Selections to the Highest Courts of Latin America
With appointments in Constitutional Courts, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador
Guatemala, and Peru all have different systems in which highest courts receive their judges.
Brazil models similarly off of the US Supreme Court, where they encompass the
Supreme Federal Tribunal (Supremo Tribunal Federal) that has the final say in constitutional

matters. The president submits about a candidate with a public hearing before the Senate, and
therefore the candidate is either approved or denied by the majority (Smit 2016).
Bolivia’s judicial system is organized differently than the US judiciary, having different
types of higher courts. Members of the Constitutional Tribunal, Supreme Court, and Agricultural
Court are elected by the general public. However, this election is still with standards. Bolivian
Constitution utilizes a “pluri-nationality” in which representation from different demographics of
the people must be met. The list of candidates is prepared by the Plurinational Legislative
Assembly, where specific quotas of women, persons of indigenous descent, etc, are pre-chosen,
then sent out for election. These candidates are not allowed to campaign, and election is merely
upon the merits and qualifications of the candidates. The result of this system with the first
election of 2011 might have seemed successful to the public, where the majority elected were
women and indigenous peoples. However, it became incredibly evident that many selected
candidates had connections with the majority party in the legislature, and most voters were
merely voting in line with the party’s instructions and did not bother educating themselves on the
candidates themselves-- hence, the diminishing of judicial independence. The Plurinational
Legislative Assembly did end up removing three of the elected candidates and pursued criminal
penalties, but this shows clearly that even with the most complex systems used in effort to
eliminate as much pressure and influence from the outside as possible, corruption is still
inevitable, and judicial independence is hindered (Smit 2016).
Chile, Guatemala, and Colombia all utilize a type of approach to appointment in which
seats are filled by different sectors of government. Chile, for example, has a Constitutional Court
comprised of ten members, where the President selects three of the seats, four are appointed by

Congress, where two of those are directly appointed by the Senate, and the other two are
proposed by the Lower House with the approval or rejection by the Senate with a two-thirds
majority, and the last three are appointed by the Supreme Court in a secret vote. Guatemala does
something similar, where there are five seats on their Constitutional Court, having a specified
five institutions fill each of the seats, with the President appointing one, Congress, the Higher
Council of the University of San Carlos, the General Assembly of the College of Lawyers, and
the Supreme Court. Additionally, Colombia embraces the same mechanism, with nine total
members elected by the Senate from specified shortlists presented by the President, Supreme
Court, and Council of State (Smit 2016).
This seems legit, but again, judicial independence can be hindered. Even if a rule of law
requires for transparency in decisions/appointments, it can easily be done under the table, and the
public can be left in hindsight when selections are made. Judicial independence is then
weakened.
The above concept has indeed been done as well, where in Guatemala, all the other
institutions made their selection processes very public, except for the President, in which he was
widely criticized for the lack of transparency. The Supreme Court’s public call for applications
noted that there was no explicit requirement or language stated for the Court to do this, but that
“the rule of law requires that any public decision should be reasoned and transparent”
(Oj.gob.gt).
Another hindering of judicial independence in the above addressed list is through the
Colombian process. Not many other jurisdictions utilize this type of four-tiered institutional
selection. And though it does make it more difficult for the executive to attempt any corruption

or influence, political ideology can still play in role in regards on the competing jurisdictions of
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Colombian land, where it is ruled by two
judicial bodies, the Supreme Court and the Council of State, that deal with the administrative
matters. It is seen, granted, that the weakness of the party system “amplifies this effect by
making Senate votes on shortlists sometimes unpredictable” and that “politicians have exercised
remarkable little control over the Constitutional Court by way of appointments” (Landau 2015).
Again, however, there is no definitive on hidden agendas with shortlists, and complete judicial
independence cannot be guaranteed (Smit 2016).
With the last of the Constitutional Courts, Ecuador’s system is a little different from the
others. A committee called the Evaluation Committee (Coisión Calificadora) has six members,
two of which are appointed by their three branches of government that include the executive,
legislative, and a new branch brought about in 2008 called the “Transparency and Social
Control.” There is a public examination process, with public scrutiny welcomed and specified
options for challenging any part of the process at hand. However, unsurprisingly, this method has
not worked, and political agendas have maneuvered their ways into the process. One incident in
2012 describes how several journalists were escorted out of the area in which Committee
members were assessing candidates, finding that the Committee is actually widely politicised
and that it allows for the executive to influence decision making (El Mercurio 2012). Not only
does this hurt public confidence, but it damages any efforts towards judicial independence,
making the process null and void when it comes to future decisions by that specific board.
Interference with Judicial Independence

It can be seen in other parts of the world, take England or France, that judicial
independence is able to be accomplished without formal language in a constitution. Though
France’s judiciary does not allow courts to hold certain laws as unconstitutional, it is able to
uphold an independent judiciary with administrative courts that are part of the executive. To
show the difference, Latin American countries, even with elaborate language in their
constitutions in attempts at trying to fulfill a robust independent judiciary, end of subservient.
The types of ways judicial independence has been deliberately hindered are through formal
abrogation, the bypassing of ordinary courts, wholesale dismissal of judges, transference or
reassignment of judges, the illusory guarantee of irreducible salaries, failure to enforce judicial
decisions, and essentially, executive domination (Rosenn 1987). These aspects are merely to
structure how even with every possible attempt, judicial independence will never be reached due
to corruption.
Interference comes in all types of ways, and obviously with the repeal or abolition of the
law itself. For example, in 1977, the de facto regime in Uruguay enacted the Institutional Act
that basically deleted any chance of judicial independence, after many years of consistent judicial
independence. The Act essentially eliminated the entire judiciary as a separate branch, making it
a part of the executive, in which therefore had the power to discard any judge on any court for
any reason at all. All authority was set under a Ministry of Justice, and all powers were
diminished (Rosenn 1987).
Cuba also experienced arbogation as such, especially under the Castro regime. In 1976,
the judiciary acquitted forty-five members of Batista’s air force on a charge of genocide, in
which Castro did not approve of this. This led to the convening of a special panel to reverse the

acquittal and the reliance on “revolutionary courts” for political trials (Baerg 1992). Judicial
independence was then officially gone with the Judicial Organization Law of 1973, which
explicitly subordinated the judiciary to the Council of Ministers. The National Assembly elects
the Supreme Court, and People’s Assemblies elect their respective local courts. Judges are
required to those responsible for their election, respected assembly, and the judges are subject to
recall (Rosenn 2012).
With bypassing the ordinary courts, special tribunals are the focus. Completely
undermining the courts and transferring specific cases to military tribunals is one way that
judicial independence is undermined. With those Latin American countries ruled by de facto
military government, this happens too often, and many a time, civilians accused of terrorism or
subversion have been tried before special or military courts rather than the ordinary court that
they should have been. Ordinary courts have also been denied to issue writs of habeas corpus or
amparo, to to even review the proceedings on appeal (Rosenn 1987).
In 1965, Brazil, like Cuba, enacted an Institutional Act that sent all and any cases having
to do with civilians and national security crimes to military tribunals. The courts were prevented
from invalidating the extension of military jurisdiction by a provision, excluding from judicial
review all governmental actions based upon the Institutional Act. This grew with time, and the
Institutional Act broadened to not only national security crimes, but crimes against social and
economic order, and crimes against popular economy (Rosenn 1987). This really exemplifies
how easily courts can be hindered and undermined, kicking judicial independence completely
out of the picture and creating an incredibly corrupt society.

With Guatemala in 1982, and similarly enacted by Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and
Uruguay, the military government pursued a “decree-law” that had for the Tribunals of Special
Jurisdiction to deal with people “accused of violating the state of siege” or “participating in other
subversive activity.” There was also no opportunity for any appeal, and judges could be anyone,
even army officers with no form of legal training in the law of the land (Rosenn 1987).
Jurisdictional problems are key to eliminating judicial independence, since it is the
easiest to pursue by a government of authoritarian aura. The proliferation of special
administrative courts and the development of a broad political question doctrine have been
widely used in Latin American countries in the past, where control is taken outside of the
regular, normal judiciary’s jurisdiction into these special tribunals. Labor courts, tax courts, and
election courts are all some of the easiest ways countries have attempted to undermine regular
courts. And though this type of model may somewhat work in other countries of the world (e.g.
France), in situations where administrative judges lack the guarantees of independence of the
ordinary judiciary, the transference of jurisdiction diminishes judicial independence (Rosenn
1987).
It is corrupt political regimes that truly devastate a judiciary and its independence, and
the wholesale dismissal of judges pursued by institutional acts issued by de facto regimes have
been a common way of killing off independence. In Argentine Supreme Court, despite
constitutional guarantee of lifetime tenure, an en masse or cleansing of the courts with
replacement has happened consistently. In 1946, all but one of the Court’s judges were removed
by the Peron party that dominated Congress. In 1957, the military regime ousted Peron, and
therefore removed all the judicial appointments made by his party. Consequently, in 1966, yet

another military regime took over, removing all those judges, and replacing with new ones. In
1973, Peron took over once more, and judges were again reassigned. Then again three years
later, with another military takeover. When democracy finally took over in 1983, replacement of
all judges was pursued as well (Rosenn 1987).
Not only is this incredibly damaging with the judiciary itself, where political intrusions
are the lifeline of every decision made, but public confidence is practically diminished
completely. There is no view of fairness or justice, and people cannot trust a court that is
constantly being changed without true reason other than a new political party taking over. There
is no consistency nor tradition, views are completely changed, and cases could be decided by
those unequipped with the correct qualifications. Judicial independence, again, hindered and
corrupt.
Another example of past purging of judiciaries can be seen in Peru, where in 1969 their
military government replaced all those on the Supreme Court with militant sympathizers, along
with the forming of a National Council of Justice, in which appointed all judges. They dismissed
the entire court, and in 1973, at the instigation of President Velasco, the Council dismissed the
entire criminal division of the Supreme Court because Velasco was unhappy with the decision of
one case. Along with this, the Velasco regime also changed the judicial retirement age and
modified it to permit the appointment of new judges or to replace those jurists deemed
unacceptable to the regime (Rosenn 1987). With this much corruption, all confidence is lost.
Judicial independence is non-existent to the public eye.
Interference can also be taken in the transference or reassignment of judges. Latin
American countries are known for de-promoting judges to lower courts if a decision made by a

judge is considered unsatisfactory. For example, in El Salvador, Judge Bernardo Rauda Murcia
made the “mistake” of sentencing five members of the National Guard to long prison sentences
after they were found guilty of the murder of four American nuns. Naturally, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision, and Judge Rauda was transferred to a completely different jurisdiction, in
which was a four hour drive from where his home was (Rosenn 1987).
It is important to note that though sometimes, transferalls are necessary for means of
flexibility and administrative practices. However, it is also important to note the difference
between just and fair transferrals, and those that make an effort to undermine a judge, a decision,
and judicial independence.
As stated before, the illusion of guarantee of irreducible salaries is easily also another
way in which Latin American countries hinder independence. Chronic inflation is the main
problem with this. Consequently, the chronically low level of judicial salaries in Latin American
countries often has been stated as a leading source in corruption. To put the inflation in scope, in
1985, the annual inflation rate of Latin American countries, not including Cuba, was 704.8%;
Bolivia being the main aspect of this, where their inflation rate was 11,743%. In Argentina, it
was widely known that waiters made more money that even the chief of the Supreme Court. It
has come to terms with many countries, however, that salaries should be executed based on real,
rather than nominal terms, to compensate for chronic inflation that may take place in a country.
In the past, even in the US, judicial resignations and lawsuits have been enacted upon because of
declining salaries, and this is in a country in which the inflation rate is much less severe than
Latin American countries. “Only if the constitutional guarantee is interpreted to require the

maintenance of the real, as opposed to the nominal, value of judicial salaries can it be a
meaningful safeguard of judicial independence in an inflationary economy” (Rosenn 1987).
It is widely known that the executive is to execute, and the judiciary to judge. But without
both working together and enforcing each to the best of the ability, failure to enforce judicial
decisions can become a way in which judicial independence is hindered. Rosenn states that
Alexander Hamilton eloquently makes the point, that the “judiciary, possessing neither the power
of the sword nor of the purse, must ultimately depend upon the executive to enforce court
decisions. Refusal of the executive to enforce judicial decisions that it does not agree with
seriously undermines the independence of the judiciary.” Since it is really a trust check and
balance, most regimes just ignore it.
In Chile 1973, under the Allende regime, a policy was enacted that allowed the executive
to merely ignore court decisions when ordering the return of illegally occupied land and seized
factories. The Court, then sent this statement:
“This Court must protest to you, as it has done innumerable times in the past,
about the illegal acts of the administrative authorities who are illicitly interfering
with the proper exercise of judicial power, and who are preventing the police
force from carrying out criminal sentences duly emanating from the criminal
courts… These acts signify a decided obstinacy in rebelling against judicial
sentences and a total lack of concern about the alteration that these attitudes and
omissions have produces in the juridical order. All of this no longer means a
simple crisis of state under the rule of Law, … but a peremptory or imminent
rupture of the country’s legality.”

Naturally, Allende rejected the Court’s statements, critical of them for preferring claims
of the rish to the claims of the poor. He stated in a letter back, stating that this is the right of the
executive, to be a “warrantor of peace and public order,” and that not every decision made by the
judiciary is to be enforced, rather that it is up to the executive to make that decision. It is not
surprising to know that Allende was ousted just a few months later by a military regime, which
“made it plain that one of the primary reasons for its taking power was the reestablishment of the
constitutional and juridical order” (Rosenn 1987).
It is now evident to see how the executive can and will undermine the judiciary. It is the
want, the buy-in of all parts of government, to uphold their end of the bargain when coming to
their respective duties. If there is not effort from all branches to want to uphold judiciary
independence, then it becomes incredibly easy to simply overlook it.
The last of all the interferences with judicial independence is executive domination, and
has been touched upon in different ways stated before. Historically, Latin American countries are
dominated by the executive; there may be checks in the systems, but not much of a balance. Any
judge who attempts to question the executive knows that they will more than likely not have a
job in the end. Hitting back with Trujillo and the Dominican Republic, Trujillo had pre-signed
letters of resignation from all judges; once there was a decision he did not approve of, the date
was inserted, and a judge was forced to step down. In Ecuador, President Velasco Ibarra’s
response to the Supreme Court’s invalidating controversial executive decrees was to simply
abrogate the Constitution and uphold dictatorial power over the Supreme Court, making his own
reforms as he pleased (Rosenn).
Conclusions

Judicial independence is imperative in the prosperity of a society. Without it, it becomes
incredibly difficult to uphold a just, fair and civil society with a rule of law and law of the land.
With Latin American countries, one is able to distinguish many different ways in which judicial
independence is taken advantage of, hindered, and plainly ignored.
Judicial independence in this region of the world has undeniably seen the worst. Some
countries, like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela are
all considered to have a degree of judicial independence, however with much executive
influence. Guatemala, Honduras, Panamá, Paraguay, and Uruguay, are considered to have
struggled with achieving judicial independence to begin with.
Every country, nonetheless, is different. One must look at government structure, region,
culture and history, political tradition and stability, all hold a factorial weight in how its own
judicial independence can be measured and therefore interpreted appropriately. Measuring
judicial independence is on a spectrum-- there is no true way to numerically set a standard, and
every standard differs in the eyes of every country.
Tenure and appoint and selection process are two of the most important ideals when
discussing judicial independence. With international principles in treaties, declarations, and
reports, it shows that there is no doubt about the importance and imperativeness of tenure and
appointment processes for supporting judicial independence and underpinning the rule of law.
Both of these safeguards contribute to judicial independence, for judges to be able to accomplish
their respective duties without fear or outside pressures, as well as what the public sees, in
transparency and confidence in their judiciary system to be able to know that their legal disputes
will be upheld to the law of the land, justly.

With tenure, a sensible conclusion can be made that permanent tenure, lifelong terms, is
the most appropriate way in ensuring judicial independence in higher courts. This has become a
sense of international standard now, and shows stability to a judge to be able to confidently make
decisions without fear of losing their post. This also shows that judges have no need to get
involved politically, and the general population is able to realize that there is no further interest
in their decisions, that otherwise fixed-terms may give off a different perception.
Likewise, with appointment and selection processes, transparency of qualifications,
processes, standards, assessment, all must be very public and very much advertised. Perceived,
as well as actual independence can be improved if the appointment process is depoliticized, and
pursued appropriately through a trusted body that will make decisions based solely on
qualifications and responsibility of upholding the law. Independent judicial councils are the best
way of selections, showing transparency, and therefore shows that no other part of government,
executive or legislative, has a hand in publicizing any part of the process.
Though Latin American countries have recently been making conscious efforts to make
sure tenure is fixed, permanent appointments have been an uneasy decision, which is why
judicial independence has also taken a hit. Instead, they use automatic renewal or restrictions on
reappointment in efforts to compensate, though even this is not a guarantee of keeping hidden
agendas from damaging independence.
For appointment, Latin American countries have been trying to take the US approach
instead of transferring responsibility of appointment to an independent body, particularly for
higher courts. Elaborate systems have been enacted upon, and these have indeed made
transparency more publicized, though there is still scrutiny in hidden agendas and independence.

In many Latin American countries, issues regarding tenure and appointment and selection
process have been hotly contested and an issue that has been brought to the public opinion, in
hopes that legal changes will improve safeguards for independence. It is positive that these are
being debated, though there is no telling what an end result would be, or if there will be one.
Latin American countries are heir to tradition, historically speaking, and it well known
that the judiciary is regarded as somewhat weak. This hurts legitimacy of the legal order, and this
also stems from the respective constitutions and violations of language and provisions, or merely
ignoring them all together. This makes things difficult for a judiciary to carry out its duties,
especially when trying to maintain a de jure authority in a de facto regime. If a regime were to
come to power by extra-constitutional means, then it is inevitable that independence will be
hindered. Revolutions weaken judiciary independence, as structure generally becomes damaged
and attempts and restructuring generally only bring political pressures and influences, as well as
corruption.
Latin American culture and political tradition are heavily authoritarian, which does not
help the aspects of trying to uphold true judicial independence. Instead of trying to pursue more
democratic endeavors that endorse independence to some extent, when nothing is able to be
done, power is taken to the executive, thus creating damage to independence, which then
coincides with corruption.
Corruption takes the face of salary or executive dominance, in which the certainties that
the judiciary, as well as the general public believes to be grounded, are immediately out of
existence. Stability is part of independence; corruption damages stability; independence is no
longer in reach.

In the end, it truly is the commitment of all to want and uphold judicial independence.
Because it cannot be measured, and because each jurisdiction is subject to its own historical,
cultural, and economic endeavors, independence can only come with commitment, and Latin
American countries have difficulty coming to this agreement. The courts have become arenas
where elites have fought meticulously over power, and the establishment of a truly independent
judiciary will be difficult unless buy-in from all is accomplished and achieved.
Though independence is not easy to accomplish and uphold, it is not entirely impossible,
to an extent. With respect to the rule of law, the path to judicial independence will be slow for
our neighbors down south. It is possible.
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